We argue that on electronic markets, competition between liquidity providers should reduce the spread until the execution cost using market orders matches that of limit orders. This implies a linear relation between the bid-ask spread and the average impact of market orders, in good agreement with our empirical observations. We then use this relation to justify a strong, and hitherto unnoticed, empirical correlation between the spread and the volatility per trade, with R 2 s exceeding 0.9. This suggests that the main determinant of the bid-ask spread is adverse selection, provided one considers the volatility per trade as a measure of the amount of 'information' included in prices at each transaction. Our methodology, which extends the work of Madhavan, Richardson & Roomans, allows us to compare meaningfully the spreads in different markets. We find that the spread is significantly larger on the nyse, a liquid market with specialists.
Introduction and review of the literature
One of the most important attribute of financial markets is to provide immediate liquidity to investors [1] , who are able to convert cash into stocks and vice-versa nearly instantaneously whenever they choose to do so. Of course, some markets are more liquid than others and the liquidity of a given market varies in time and can in fact dramatically dry up in crisis situations. How should markets be organized, at the micro-structural level, to optimize liquidity, to favor steady and orderly trading and avoid these liquidity crises? In the past, the burden of providing liquidity was given to "market makers" (or specialists). In order to ensure steady trading, the specialists alternatively sell to buyers and buy to sellers, and get compensated by the so-called bid-ask spread -i.e. the price at which they sell to the crowd is always slightly larger than the price at which they buy. The determinants of the value of the spread in specialists markets have been the subject of many studies in the economics literature [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] .
However, most financial markets have nowadays become fully electronic (with the notable exception of the New-York Stock Exchange, nyse -although this will soon change). In these markets, liquidity is self-organized, in the sense that any agent can choose, at any instant of time, to either provide liquidity or consume liquidity. More precisely, any agent can provide liquidity by posting limit orders: these are propositions to sell (or buy) a certain volume of shares or lots at a fixed minimum (maximum) price. Limit orders are stored in the order-book. At a given instant in time, the best offer on the sell side (the 'ask') is higher than the best price on the buy side (the 'bid') so no transaction takes place. For a transaction to occur, an agent must consume liquidity by issuing a market order to buy (or to sell) a certain number of shares; the transaction occurs at the best available price, provided the volume in the order book at that price is enough to absorb the incoming market order. Otherwise, the price 'walks up' (or down) the ladder of offers in the order book, until the order is fully satisfied. The liquidity of the market is partially characterized by the bid-ask spread S, which sets the cost of an instantaneous round-trip of one share (a buy instantaneously followed by a sell, or vice versa). 1 A liquid market is such that this cost is small. A question of both theoretical and practical crucial importance is to know what fixes the magnitude of the spread in the self-organized set-up of electronic markets, and the relative merit of limit vs. market orders. In the present work, we argue that on electronic markets, profitable high frequency strategies using either limit or market orders should not exist, imposing a linear relation between the bidask spread S and the average impact of market orders. This, in turn justifies a simple, but hitherto unnoticed, proportionality relation between the spread and the volatility per trade.
In a large fraction of the economics literature [2, 3, 4, 5] , liquidity providers are described as market makers who earn their profit from the spread. In a competitive framework the spread should be determined by requiring that such a strategy has near-zero gain on average. The resulting spread is non zero because this market making strategy has costs. Three types of cost are discussed in the literature:
• (i) order processing costs; 1 Other determinants of liquidity discussed in the literature are the depth of the order book and market resiliency [11, 12] .
• (ii) adverse selection costs: liquidity takers may have superior information on the future price of the stock, in which case the market maker loses money; 2
• (iii) inventory risk: market makers may temporarily accumulate large long or short positions which are risky. If agents are risk-sensitive and have to limit their exposure, this adds extra-costs.
Theoretical models that account for these costs typically introduce a rather large amount of free parameters (such as risk-aversion, fraction of informed trades, fraction of patient/ impatient traders, etc.) most of which cannot be measured directly. In order to extract the different determinants of the spread from empirical data, some drastic assumptions must be made. For example, assuming the order flow to be short-ranged correlated, Huang and Stoll [8] find that 90% of the spread is associated to order processing costs, and not to adverse selection 3 . This is surprising, both because processing costs can be estimated to be at least ten times smaller than the spread, in particular on electronic markets, where the spread is nonetheless found comparable to the spread in markets with specialists. A related approach is that of [9] , where the ratio of adverse selection to processing costs was estimated to be in the range 35 − 50% on the nyse in 1990. We will review this theoretical framework below and detail the similarities and differences with our own analysis; one important difference is the assumption that the order imbalance has short-ranged correlations [8, 9] , and therefore that market impact of a single trade is permanent, in striking disagreement with empirical data, where the order flow is instead found to be a long-memory process [14, 15] , and single trade impact transient, but decaying very slowly [14, 16] . On general grounds, both adverse selection and inventory risk imply a positive correlation between the spread and the volatility of the traded asset. This makes perfect intuitive sense, and the aim of the present paper is to clarify in detail the origin of this relation. Positive correlation between spread and volatility is indeed documented empirically (see e.g. [17, 4, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22] ), but is not particularly spectacular and stands as one among other reported correlations, e.g., with traded volume, flow of limit orders, market capitalization, etc. Here, we want to argue theoretically, and demonstrate empirically on different markets, that there is in fact a very strong correlation between the spread and the volatility per trade, rather than with the volatility per unit time. Such a strong relation was first noted on the case of France-Telecom [14] , and independently on the stocks of the ftse-100 [23] , but no theoretical argument was given in favor of this relation.
From a theoretical point of view, several statistical models of limit and market order flows have been analyzed to understand the distribution of the bid-ask spread, and relate its average value to flow and cancellation rates [3, 24, 25, 26, 28, 27, 29, 30] . Some models include strategic considerations in order placement and look for a trade-off between the cost of delayed execution and that of immediacy, but suppose that the price dynamics is bounded in a finite interval [25] , therefore neglecting the long term volatility of the price (see also [29, 30] ). As such, these finite band models have nothing to say about the spread-volatility relationship. Another line of models discards all strategic components ("Zero intelligence models") and assume Poisson rates for limit orders, market orders and cancellation [26, 28, 27] . 4 One can then compute both the average bid-ask spread and the long-term volatility as a function of these Poisson rates, and compare these predictions with empirical data [31] . The problem with such models is that although the order flow itself is completely random, the persistence of the order book leads to strong non-diffusive short term predictability of the price, which would be very easily picked off by high frequency automated execution machines. These programs search to optimize execution costs (see e.g. [10, 35] ) by adequately conditioning the order flow (proportion of limit and market orders, timing, aggressivity) and use any short-term predictability to do so. As a result there are in fact very strong high frequency correlations in the order flow, coming from the 'hide and seek' game played by buyers and sellers within the order book [14, 15, 33] . It should be emphasized that for small tick stocks, the total available volume in the order book at any instant in time is in fact extremely small, on the order of 10 −5 − 10 −4 of the market capitalization, or 10 −3 − 10 −2 of the daily volume (see Table 2 in Appendix 2). Clearly, the reason for such a small outstanding liquidity is that liquidity providers want to avoid giving a free trading option to informed traders. As a consequence, liquidity takers must cut their total order in small chunks; this creates the long term correlation in order flow [34] . But since on electronic markets sophisticated buyers and sellers can trade using at their best convenience either limit or market orders, the average cost of limit and market orders should be very similar. If -say -market orders were on average significantly more expensive than limit orders, more limit orders would be issued, thereby reducing the spread and the cost of market orders, until an equilibrium is reached. 5 That a competitive ecology between limit and market orders should exist on order-driven markets was emphasized in [37, 14, 16] . However, the quantitative consequences of such a symmetry between market and limit orders were not discussed. In the following, we show that this approximate symmetry gives some constraints between the average price impact of a market order and the bid-ask spread, which we check empirically. We then argue that the impact function must be related to the volatility per trade, a property that we again check on data. This allows us to establish a proportionality relation between the spread and volatility per trade, which holds both across different stocks and for a given stock across time, on electronic markets and on the nyse. This shows that in a competitive electronic market the bid-ask spread in fact mostly comes from "adverse selection", provided one extends this notion to account for the fact that trades can be uninformed but still impact the price. What is relevant here is that any unexpected component of the market order flow, whether it is truly informed or just random, impacts the price and creates a cost for limit orders, which must be compensated by the spread, as we now explain in details.
2 Limit orders vs market orders and market impact
A simple theoretical framework
We start by reviewing the theoretical framework proposed by Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (mrr) in [9] , which helps define various quantities and hone in on relevant questions. We will call v i the volume of the ith market order, and ǫ i the sign of that market order (ǫ = +1 for a buy and ǫ = −1 for a sell). The assumptions of the model are (i) that all trades have the same volume v i = v and (ii) the ǫ i 's are generated by a Markov process with correlation ρ, which means that the average value of ǫ i conditioned on the past only depends on ǫ i−1 and is given by:
where ... denotes averaging. The case ρ = 0 corresponds to independent trade signs, whereas ρ > 0 describes positive autocorrelations of trades. Note that in this model, correlations decay exponentially:
The mrr model assumes that the 'true' price p i evolves both because of random external shocks (or news) and because of trade impact. It is natural to postulate that both external news and surprise in order flow surprise should move the price.
Since the surprise at the ith trade is given by ǫ i − ρǫ i−1 , mrr write the following evolution equation for the price:
where ξ is the shock component, with variance ξ 2 i = Σ 2 , and θ measures trade impact, assumed to be constant (all trades are assumed to have the same volume).
Since market makers cannot guess the surprise of the next trade, they post a bid price b i and an ask price a i given by:
where φ is the extra compensation claimed the market maker, covering processing costs and the shock component risk. The above rule ensures no ex-post regrets for the market maker. The spread is therefore S ≡ a − b = 2(θ + φ), whereas the midpoint m ≡ (a + b)/2 immediately before the ith trade is given by:
These equations allow to compute several important quantities for the following discussion. The first one is the lagged impact function introduced in [14, 16] :
which is found, within the mrr model, to increase from R 1 = θ(1 − ρ) to R ∞ = θ (See Appendix 1 and Fig. 1 ). Due to correlations between trades, the long time impact is therefore enhanced compared to the short term impact by a factor λ ∞ = 1/(1 − ρ). The second quantity is the mid-point volatility, defined as:
which is easily computed to be: 6
Within the above interpretation, the mrr model therefore predicts the following simple relations between spread, impact and volatility per trade:
which we generalize and test empirically in the following. Note that in the simplest case of independent trade signs (ρ = 0), the impact function is time independent. In the absence of extra compensation for the market makers, φ = 0 and the above equation reduces to R 1 = S/2. In economical terms, this equality has a very simple meaning: it indicates that on average, the new mid-price after the transaction m i+1 = m i + ǫ i R is equal to the last transaction price m i + ǫ i S/2, and therefore that R 1 = S/2 is precisely the condition where both market orders and limit orders have zero cost. From the data analysis of mrr, one concludes that φ was rather large on the nyse in 1990, where φ/θ ∼ 1 − 2. 6 The is an extra contribution to σ 2 1 coming from any high-frequency noise component that we neglect here, coming from decimalisation, small volumes at bid/ask, etc. See [9, 14] and footnote 18 below.
Market order strategies
The above model, although suggestive and capturing the essence of the correlation between spread, impact and volatility, is however not fully satisfactory since it completely neglects the very broad distribution of traded volumes (often found to be log-normal, or power-law tailed) and, more importantly, the very long ranged correlation of the trade signs, which is found to decay as [14, 15] 
instead of the fast, exponential decay assumed in the mrr model. Because the exponent γ is less than unity, the correlation function is not integrable, which technically makes the series of trade signs a long-memory process. As emphasized in [14, 16] , this imposes a number of non-trivial constraints on price impact for the returns to remain uncorrelated. In this section and below, we want to show how the simple relations derived above can be extended and tested in the general case of fluctuating volumes and long-ranged correlation of trade signs. A first idea is to measure empirically the average execution cost of market-orders, which we define as the difference between the transaction price at (trade-)time i and the mid-point price at time i + T later, with T ≫ 1 but still much smaller than the typical horizon of the trading decision (a few days or more). The above definition of execution cost marks the trade to market after T . The volume weighted averaged cost (over N trades) of a single market order is therefore:
where the volume-dependent lagged impact is defined as: 9
In the mrr model, v takes a single value and R ℓ (v) reduces to the previously defined quantity. The function R ℓ (v) was studied in detail in [14] . To a good level of approximation, the following factorization property is found to hold:
is a strongly concave function, and R(ℓ) an increasing function of ℓ that varies by a factor of ∼ 2 when ℓ increases from 1 to several thousands (corresponding to a few days of trading). 10 The shape of R(ℓ), averaged over a collection of different stocks of the pse, is shown in Fig. 1 , and compared with the simple form assumed in the mrr model (see caption for more details). Our above choice of ℓ allows us to use the asymptotic value of R, R(ℓ ≫ 1) = λ ∞ R(1), where we have introduced a factor λ ∞ in conformity with the notation of the previous section. Using the factorization property of R ℓ (v), we finally obtain for the average cost of a single market order:
meaning, as intuitively clear, that this cost is positive when spreads are large, but may be negative if the total price impact λ ∞ R 1 is large. In the plane x = vR 1 (v) v / v , y = vS / v (which will be used to represent empirical data below) the condition C = 0 defines a straight line of slope 2λ ∞ separating a region where market orders are on average costly, from a region where single market orders are favored: see Fig. 2 . 8 The following computation neglects the fact that one single large market order may trigger transactions at several different prices, up the order book ladder, and pay more than the nominal spread. Nevertheless this situation is empirically quite rare, and corresponds to only a few percents of all cases [40] . 9 In the definition of R, care has been taken to remove any long term trend of the mid-point. In any case, since ǫ is close to zero, this trend contribution would very nearly vanish. 10 The true asymptotic behaviour of R(ℓ) for longer horizons is difficult to determine empirically and might in fact be stock dependent, see [16] for a discussion of this point.
The above computation sets an upper bound on the spread: for larger spreads, the positive average cost of market order would deter their use; limit orders would then pile up and reduce the spread. What happens if the spread is below the red line of slope 2λ ∞ in Fig. 2 ? Naively, market orders have a negative cost in that region, and one should be able to devise profitable strategies based solely on market orders. The idea would be to try to benefit from the impact term R ∞ in the above balance equation. The growth of R ℓ ultimately comes from the correlation between trades, i.e. the succession of buy (sell) trades that typically follow a given buy (sell) market order. The simplest 'copy-cat' strategy which one can test with empirical data is to place a market order with vanishing volume fraction (not to affect the subsequent history of quotes and trades), immediately following another market order. This strategy suffers on average from the impact of the initial trade. Therefore, the true profit g M of such a market order strategy is reduced to:
Imposing that this gain should be non-positive, one obtains a lower line in the plane x, y, of slope 2(λ ∞ − 1). Only below this line would the above infinitesimal copy-cat strategy be profitable. We therefore expect markets to operate above this line and below the line of slope 2λ ∞ . Another way to understand that there is no contradiction in residing below the 2λ ∞ line is to notice that the cost for executing a series of market orders (which is the typical situation faced by large investors) must include the impact of past trades and this increases their average cost. Therefore, the slope of the effective zero-cost line for a series of market orders is indeed smaller than 2λ ∞ . Let us now take the complementary point of view of limit orders and determine the region of profitable market making strategies.
A market making strategy
Our aim is to discuss the profitability of providing liquidity to the market following the idea of infinitesimal strategies used in the previous section. To do so we compute the gain of a simple market making strategy which consists in participating to a vanishing fraction of all trades through limit orders. More precisely, we consider a market maker with a time horizon T who provides an infinitesimal fraction ϕ of the total available liquidity. The market maker posts limit orders both at the bid and at the ask. This market making strategy generates typical inventory imbalances of order √ T , which we again mark-to-market at the end of the period T . The optimal market making strategy should depend on the statistics and correlations in the order flow. We will instead assume the above sub-optimal, but universal strategy, which blindly participates to all transactions. This suboptimal strategy leads to a lower bound on the gains. 
showing several regions: (i) above the red line of slope 2λ ∞ , market orders are costly (on average) and market making is profitable; (ii) below the blue line of slope 2, marketmaking cannot be profitable; (iii) above the black line of slope 2λ T , market making on time scale T (or faster) are profitable (PMM); (iv) below the green line of slope 2(λ ∞ − 1), copy-cat strategies can be profitable (PCC). Since neither single market orders nor liquidity providing should be systematically penalized for markets to ensure steady trading, we expect that markets should operate in the 'neutral wedge' in between the blue and the red line. Since copy-cat strategies should not be profitable either, the neutral wedge should be further reduced to the region above the green line.
As mentioned above, the cost of the market maker comes from market impact: the price move between 0 and T is anti-correlated with the accumulated position. When the crowd buys, the price goes up while the market making strategy accumulates a short position which would be costly to buy back at time T , and vice-versa. The total gain of the market-making strategy, marked-to-market at time T , is given by:
This expression shows clearly that the gain of the market maker is determined by the competition between the spread (first term) and the impact of market orders (second term). Using the above definition of the average impact function, one obtains for the average gain of the above market making strategy, per unit of traded volume and per unit time, the following expression: 11
where we introduced the notation Fig. 1 and has a shape similar to R ℓ itself. From the factorization property of R ℓ (v), one deduces that R ℓ can again be expressed as:
where λ ℓ is a ℓ dependent number between 1 and ≈ 2 (see Fig. 1 ). Therefore, the gain of the market making strategy with horizon T can be put in a form similar to Eq.(13) above:
One can again visualize this result in the (x, y) plane defined above, as represented in Fig. 2 . One sees that depending on the horizon T , the limit of profitability of limit orders is a line of varying slope. Contrarily to market orders which benefit from the growth of the impact R ℓ with time, slow market making is suboptimal. For T ≫ 1, λ T → λ ∞ and the limit of profitability of slow market making is, 11 Essentially the same result would obtain for a steady state market making strategy with inventory control such that the fraction ϕ becomes time dependent, given by:
where V i is the (signed) position accumulated up to time i − . In this case, the typical position is always bounded and the inventory cost per trade is given by as expected, the red line of Fig. 2 . Faster strategies correspond to values of λ T closer to unity, and therefore to an extended region of profitability for market making. 12 Since λ(T ) ≥ 1, the lower limit of profitability for any market making strategies is set by the following bound:
defining a line of slope 2 in the x, y plane. Eqs. (13, 14, 19) and the resulting microstructural "phase diagram" of Fig. 2 are our central results. They show that the cost and profitability of simple infinitesimal market and limit order strategies can be estimated from empirical data alone, without having to make any assumption on the fraction of informed trades. These relations define in the x, y plane an upper bound of slope 2λ ∞ and a lower bound of slope 2 between which electronic markets are expected to operate, since neither single market orders nor liquidity providing should be systematically penalized. Furthermore, if neither market making nor market taking strategies can be made profitable, one expects the blue line (of slope 2) and green line (of slope 2(λ ∞ − 1)) of Fig. 2 to be very close to one another and determine a linear relation between market impact and spread. This is what we test on empirical data in the following section.
3 Comparison with empirical data
Small tick electronic markets
We first consider small tick electronic markets, such as the Paris Stock Exchange (pse) or Index Futures. The case of large tick stocks is different since in this case the spread is (nearly) always one tick, with huge volumes at both the bid and the ask. The case of such markets will be considered below.
We studied extensively the set of the 68 most liquid stocks of the pse during the year 2002. The summary statistics describing these stocks is given in Appendix 2. From the Trades and Quotes data, one has access the the bid-ask just before each trade, from which one can obtain the sign and the volume of each trade (depending on whether the trade happened at the ask or at the bid) and the mid-point just before the trade. From this information, one computes the quantities of interest, such as the instantaneous impact function R 1 , the spread S and λ ∞ . Note that we have removed 'block trades', which appear as transactions with volumes larger than what is available at the best price that are not followed by a change of quotes. Clearly, these block trades are outside the scope of the above arguments; in any case they represent typically a 5 − 10% fraction of the total number of trades and do not significantly affect the following results.
We test the above ideas in two different ways -for a given stock across time, and across all different stocks. Since both the spread and impact vary with time, one can measure 'instantaneous' quantities by averaging for a given stock Sv / v and vR 1 (v) v / v over a number of successive trades. In the example of Fig. 3 , each point corresponds to an average over 10000 non overlapping trades, corresponding to 2 days of trading in the case of France Telecom in 2002. Doing so we obtain quantities that vary by a factor 5 that allows us to test the linear dependence predicted by Eqs. (14, 19) . For France Telecom, we find that λ ∞ is close to the average value 1.85 shown in Fig. 1 . Therefore 2(λ ∞ − 1) < ≈ 2 in this case, meaning that copy-cat market making strategies are impossible, as expected for highly liquid stocks. Our results shown in Fig.3 is in very good agreement with the above theoretical bounds. Note that the lower bound is violated only on rather rare occasions, even on averages over rather short time scales. A linear fit with zero intercept gives a slope equal to 2.14, corresponding to λ = 1.07, meaning that providing liquidity is only marginally well rewarded for this very liquid, small tick stock. In fact, if the intercept of the linear fit is left free, its value (which should equal the 'processing costs' 2φ in the mrr model) is found to be slightly negative.
We also test Eq.(19) cross sectionally in Fig. 4 , using the above 68 different stocks of the pse. The relative values of the spread and the average impact also varies by a factor 5 between the different stocks, which enables to test the linear relations (14, 19) . Once again we find a good agreement with the predicted bound, and the linear fit with zero intercept gives a slope of 2.86, or λ ≈ 1.43, with R 2 = 0.90. Again, the intercept of the regression would be slightly negative, showing that no order processing costs can be detected on these fully electronic markets.
It is also interesting to analyze small tick Futures markets, for which the typical spread is ten times smaller than on stock markets. We have studied a series of small tick Index Futures in 2005 (except the mib for which the data is 2004), again both as a function of time and across the 7 indexes of our set. Results are shown in Fig. 5 ; the bounds are again quite well obeyed both across contracts and across time, even when the time averaging is restricted to only 1000 consecutive trades. This shows that on these highly liquid contracts, where the transaction rate as high as a few per second, the equilibrium between limit and market orders is reached very quickly. 
NYSE stocks
The case of the nyse is quite interesting since the market is still ruled by specialists, who however compete to provide liquidity with other market participants placing limit orders. We again test Eqs. (13, 19) cross sectionally, using the set of the 155 most actively traded stocks on the nyse in 2005. 13 We use the bid-ask quote posted by the specialist. We have first determined the average impact function R(ℓ), which has a shape roughly similar to Fig. 1 , although the asymptotic plateau value is slightly larger, leading to λ ∞ ≈ 2.1. Plotting the data in the spread-impact plane, we now find that the empirical results cluster around to the upper limit where market orders become costly. The regression has a significantly larger slope of 3.3 and now a positive intercept 2φ ≈ 1.3 basis points. 14 This suggests that, perhaps not surprisingly, market makers on the nyse post spreads that are systematically over-estimated compared to the situation in electronic markets, with a non-zero extrapolated spread 2φ for zero market impact. This result is in agreement with the study of Harris and Hasbrouck performed in the early 90's on the nyse [38] , which showed that limit orders were more favorable than market orders, and with Handa and Schwartz [39] , who showed that pure limit order strategies were profitable. On the other hand, the value of the regression slope on the purely electronic pse show that pure limit order strategies can only be marginally profitable. Quite interestingly, our analysis allows us to compare in a simple and meaningful way the spread in different markets. Both quantities are expressed in basis points. We also show our bounds, Eqs. (13, 14, 19) . The data shows clearly that market orders are less favorable than in the electronic Paris Bourse. The regression now has a positive intercept of 1.3 bp with an R 2 = 0.87.
The case of large tick electronic markets
A priori, the string of arguments leading to Eq. (19) does not directly apply in the case where the tick size is large. In that case the spread S is most of the time stuck to its minimum value, i.e. one tick, while the size of the queue q at the bid and at the ask tends to be extremely large (see e.g. Appendix 2, Table  3 ). Because of the large value of the spread, limit orders appear to be favorable, but huge limit order volumes accumulate as liquidity providers attempt to take advantage of the spread. The size of the queue q at the bid or at the ask is thus much larger than the typical value of the traded volume at each transaction v: v/q ≈ 0.01 (see Table 3 ), to be compared with v/q ≈ 0.2 − 0.3 (see Appendix 2, Table 2 ) for smaller tick stocks. Therefore, the simple market making strategy considered above, which assumes that one can participate to a small fraction of all transactions, cannot be implemented. We thus expect that the spread on these markets will be substantially larger than predicted by the bound Eq. (19) , because the competition between liquidity providers, that acts to reduce the spread, cannot fully operate. We indeed find that the ratio between vS and vR 1 v is large for large tick stocks. For example, in the case of Ericsson, during the period March-November 2004, for which the tick size is ∼ 50 bp, we find vS / vR 1 v ≈ 4.5. However, we also find on the same data that λ ∞ ≈ 4.5 ± 1., meaning that market orders are in fact not systematically unfavored in these large tick electronic markets, see Fig. 7 . In fact, the copy-cat strategy would even appear to be profitable in this case, although one should worry that in this case, the average impact function is very different from the typical case, where R 1 is most of the times zero, and rarely very large, equal to S/2. In particular, the error bar on R 1 and λ ∞ are quite large in this case, meaning that the data points are in fact not incompatible with the zero-gain for copy-cat strategies. Both quantities are expressed in basis points. The volume weighted average spread is nearly constant, ≈ 50 bp. We also show our bounds, Eqs. (13, 19) , within which all data points lie. Note that in this case, λ ∞ is found to be quite large, ≈ 4.5 ± 1. Since the error bar on the green line is rather large, the data points might in fact lie closer to the PCC limit of Fig. 2. 
Comparison with empirical data: conclusion
Our empirical analysis shows that on small tick electronic markets, an approximate symmetry between limit and market orders indeed holds, in the sense that neither market orders nor limit orders are systematically unfavorable. Markets operates in the 'neutral wedge' of Fig. 2 . For fully electronic markets, competition for providing liquidity is efficient in keeping the spread close to its lowest value, marginally compensating the impact cost; there is no room for simple market taking strategies either. On the nyse, spreads appears to be significantly larger but a linear relation between spread and impact still applies, albeit with a residual intercept (corresponding to market maker "processing costs") which is absent in electronic markets.
Liquidity vs. volatility 4.1 Theoretical considerations
Consider again the mrr model discussed above, which predicts a simple relation between volatility and impact, Eq. (8) . Using the relation between spread and impact established above, this suggests a direct link between volatility per trade and spread, which we motivate and test in this section.
By definition of the volatility per trade σ 2 1 = (m ℓ+1 − m ℓ ) 2 and of the instantaneous impact r 1,i ≡ (m i+1 − m i ).ǫ i , one has as an identity:
The instantaneous impact r 1,i is expected to fluctuate over time for several reasons. First, the volume of the trade, the volume in the book and the spread strongly fluctuate with time. For example, on the pse, the spread has a distribution close to an exponential, hence one has S 2 ≈ 2 S 2 (see Table 2 , Appendix). 15 Large impact fluctuations may also arise from quote revisions due to addition or cancellation of some limit orders. Second, there might also be important news affecting the 'fundamental price' of the stock. These result in large, instantaneous jumps of the mid-point, unrelated to the trading activity itself. In order to account for both effects, we write, generalizing the above mrr relation:
where R 1 ≡ R 1 (v) v is the average impact after one trade, a is a coefficient measuring the variance of impact fluctuations and Σ 2 is the news component of the volatility (see Section 2.1). A specific model for Eq. (21) was worked out in [14] , and tested on France-Telecom (see also [42] ). Here, we establish that this relation holds quite precisely across different stocks of the pse, with a correlation of R 2 = 0.96 (see Fig. (8) ). Perhaps surprisingly, the exogenous 'news volatility' contribution Σ 2 is found to be small. (The intercept of the best affine regression is even found to be slightly negative). This could be related to the observation made in Farmer et al. [40] that for most price jumps, some limit orders are canceled to slowly and get 'grabbed' by fast market orders, which means that most of these events are already included in R 1 , in line with our general statement about symmetry between limit and market orders. 16 In the following, we will therefore neglect Σ 2 , as suggested by Fig. (8) : in this sense the volatility of the stock can be mostly attributed to market activity. This is in agreement with the conclusions of Lyons and Evans on currency markets [41] ; see also the discussion in [14, 36] . Our final assumption is that of universality, i.e. when the tick size is small enough and the typical number of shares traded is large enough, all stocks within the same market should behave identically up to a rescaling of the average spread and the average volume. In particular we assume that the statistics of (i) the volume of market orders (ii) the spread S and (iii) the impact R, and the correlations between these quantities are independent on the stock when these quantities are normalized by their average value. 17 This universality implies that:
where b is stock independent. Similarly, 16 One could argue that our results in fact show that the news volatility Σ itself is proportional to R 1 and thus to the spread S. However, there is no reason why this should a priori be the case. For example, a model where jumps of typical amplitude J have a probability per trade p leads to Σ = √ pJ, whereas the cost of such jumps, contributing to S, is pJ. 17 The universality of the shape of the order book was indeed checked to hold rather well in [28] .
where b ′ is also stock independent. Note that this assumption is consistent with the empirical observation of [43] , where the impact function R 1 (v) for different US stocks can indeed be rescaled onto a unique Master curve by a proper scaling of both the x and y axis. We test Eqs. (22, 23) in Fig. 9 in the case of the Paris Stock Exchange, from which we extract b ≈ 1.02 and b ′ ≈ 1.80. Interestingly, we find that the volume and the spread are nearly uncorrelated (b = 1), whereas the volume traded and the impact are correlated (b ′ > 1), as expected. Figure 9 : Plot of vX v / v vs. X v , where X is either the spread S or the instantaneous impact R 1 (v) (multiplied by a factor 5 for clarity). The quality of the linear regression tests our universality assumption, which is excellent for S (R 2 = 0.98) and satisfactory for R 1 (R 2 = 0.9). The value of b ≈ 1.02 and b ′ ≈ 1.80 are given by the slope of these regressions. Data here corresponds to the 68 stocks of the pse in 2002.
Therefore, using Eq. (19) as an equality (as suggested by the empirical results of Section 3, and Eqs. (21, 22, 23) , we obtain the main result of this paper:
where c is a stock independent numerical constant, which can be expressed using the constants introduced above as c = 2λb ′ / √ ab. This very simple relation between volatility per trade and average spread was noted in [14, 23] , and we present further data in the next section to support this conjecture. Therefore, the constraints that (i) optimized high frequency execution strategies impose that the price is diffusive (see [14, 16] ), and (ii) the cost of limit and market orders are nearly equal [Eqs. (13, 19) ], lead to a simple relation between liquidity and volatility. As an important remark, note that the above relation is not expected to hold for the volatility per unit time σ, since it involves an extra stock-dependent and time-dependent quantity, namely the the trading frequency ν, through:
We will discuss this issue further in Section 5.
Comparison with empirical data
Using the same data sets as in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, we now test empirically the predicted linear relation between spread and volatility per trade, Eq. (24). The average spread S is defined as the average distance between bid and ask immediately before each trade (and not as the average over all posted quotes). The volatility per trade is defined as the root mean square of the trade by trade return. 18 Our results for the Paris Stock Exchange are shown in Figs 10 and 11 . We see that Eq. (24) describes the data very well, with R 2 s over 0.9. Interestingly, using the results obtained above across the pse stocks, we have a ′ ≈ 10.9, b ≈ 1.02, b ′ ≈ 0.53, λ ≈ 1.43, leading to c ≈ 1.53, in close correspondence with the direct regression result c ≈ 1.58. Similar results are obtained for Index futures (Figs. 12-a & b) or for the nyse (Fig. 13) , with values of c which are all very similar c ∼ 1.2 − 1.6. We have also checked that there is an average intra-day pattern which is followed in close correspondence both by S and σ 1 : spreads are larger at the opening of the market and decline throughout the day. Note that the trading frequency ν increases as time elapses, which, using Eq. (25), explains the familiar U-shaped pattern of the volatility per unit time.
Discussion and conclusion
The main theoretical result of this paper is the possibility to express the cost of market orders and the profit of infinitesimal market-making/taking strategies in terms of directly observable quantities, namely the spread and the impact function. Imposing that market taking/liquidity providing strategies are marginally profitable allows one to define viable regions of the microstructural "phase-diagram" (Fig. 2) where electronic markets should operate, and suggest a linear relation between spread and impact. This relation is in good agreement with empirical data on small tick contracts, with a slope compatible with the marginal profitability hypothesis. This suggests that optimized execution strategies using either limit or market orders have on average similar costs, at least when the tick size is small. This approximate symmetry should in fact be expected since all market participants can choose to use one type of order or the other; any persistent asymmetry would be easily detected and be corrected by high frequency traders or VWAP machines. This means, quite interestingly, that minimization of execution costs leads to an efficient self-organization of liquidity in electronic markets (at least in normal conditions). Our analysis allows us to compare in an objective way the spreads in different markets and suggests that spreads are distinctly too large on the nyse. Note that our analysis do not require any model specific assumptions such as the nature of order flow correlations or the fraction of informed trades. In fact our results hold even if trades are all uninformed but still mechanically impact the price.
Making reasonable further assumptions, we have then shown that spread S and volatility per trade σ 1 are also proportional, a result that we confirm empirically with correlations above 0.9. This very simple relation sheds light on the debate in the literature about the determinants of the bid-ask spread, and suggests that the bid-ask spread is dominated by adverse selection, if one considers that the volatility per trade is a measure of the amount of 'information' included in prices at each transaction. There are two complementary economic interpretations of the relation σ 1 ∼ S in small tick markets:
• (i) since the typical available liquidity in the order book is quite small, market orders tend to grab a significant fraction of the volume at the best price; furthermore, the size of the 'gap' above the ask or below the bid is observed to be on the same order of magnitude as the bid-ask spread itself which therefore sets a natural scale for price variations. Hence both the impact and the volatility per trade are expected to be of the order of S, as observed;
• (ii) the relation can also be read backward as S ∼ σ 1 : when the volatility per trade is large, the risk of placing limit orders is large and therefore the spread widens until limit orders become favorable.
Therefore, there is a clear two-way feedback that imposes the relation σ 1 ∼ S, valid on average; any significant deviation tends to be corrected by the resulting relative flow of limit and market orders. Our result therefore appears as a fundamental property of the markets organization, which should be satisfied within any theoretical description of the micro-structure. Zero intelligence models [31] , or bounded-range models [25, 29, 30] fail to predict any universal relation between S and σ 1 . Our relation involves the volatility per trade whereas most of the econometric work has instead focused on the volatility per unit time σ. The relation between the two involves the trading frequency ν, which is itself both time-and stockdependent. As a function of time, we find, in agreement with [46] , that volatility per trade and trading frequency are positively correlated; the volatility σ = σ 1 √ ν therefore increases because both σ 1 and ν increase. 19 Across stocks, on the other 19 The long-memory property of σ is argued in [45] to be related to long range correlation in hand, the volatility per unit time exhibit only weak systematic variations with capitalization C: σ ∼ C ϕ with ϕ ≈ 0, whereas the trading frequency increases with capitalization as ν ∼ C ζ . For stocks belonging to the ftse-100, Zumbach finds ζ ≈ 0.44 [23] , while for US stocks the scaling for ν is less clear [47] . Interestingly, our result then leads to a result between average spread and capitalization of the form S ∼ C ϕ−ζ/2 ∼ C −0.22 , in good agreement with Zumbach's data [23] , with the impact data of Lillo et al. [43] and with our own data on the pse. The fundamental question at this stage is to know what fixes the volatility σ and the trading frequency ν. Clearly, the trading frequency has to do with the available liquidity and the way large volumes have to be cut in small pieces. But is the volatility per unit time the primary object, driven by a fundamental process such as the arrival of news, to which the volatility per trade and therefore the spread is slaved? Or is the market micro-structure and trading activity imposing, in a bottom-up way, the value of the volatility? Understanding these coupled dynamical problems appears to be a major challenge for the theory of financial markets, and an unavoidable step to understand the interrelation between order flow and price changes, and liquidity and market efficiency [9, 41, 19, 20, 36, 14, 15, 48] .
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Appendix 1: Impact and volatility in the mrr model
From the basic equation determining the dynamics of the mid-point,
one gets:
Therefore, taking into account the correlation between ǫs, and the assumption that external shocks are uncorrelated with the order flow, the impact function is:
the trading frequency rather than in the volatility per trade, but see [22] .
Note that in this model, the 'bare' impact function G 0 (ℓ) defined in [14, 16] through:
is here found to be constant, equal to G 0 (ℓ) = θ(1 − ρ). Finally, one finds:
and Table 2 : Pool of the 68 stocks of the pse studied in this paper, with their summary statistics for 2002. The daily turnover is in million Euros, q t is the average amount in book (bid+ask) in thousand Euros, v is the average size of market order (in thousand Euros). The total number of trades (in thousand) corresponds to the whole year 2002. The volatility per trade σ 1 , the average spread S , the spread standard deviation σ S , the average response R 1 and the average tick size are all in basis points. Note that σ S ≈ S , characteristic of an exponential distribution of the spread. Note also that the volume available at the best prices is ∼ 10 −3 of the daily turnover. Units are the same as in Table 2 , except q t which is now in million Euros. Note that v / q t ≈ 10 −2 . 
